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________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Crystallex International Corp., a Canadian gold mining 
company, invested hundreds of millions of dollars to develop 
gold deposits in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  In 
2011, Venezuela expropriated those deposits and transferred 
them to its state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, 
S.A. (“PDVSA”).  To seek redress, Crystallex invoked a 
bilateral investment treaty between Canada and Venezuela to 
file for arbitration before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes.  The arbitration took place 
in Washington, D.C., and Crystallex won; the arbitration panel 
awarded it $1.2 billion plus interest for Venezuela’s 
expropriation of its investment.  The United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia confirmed that award and 
issued a $1.4 billion federal judgment.  Now Crystallex is 
trying to collect. 
Unable to identify Venezuelan-held commercial assets 
in the United States that it can lawfully seize, Crystallex went 
after U.S.-based assets of PDVSA.  Specifically, it sought to 
attach PDVSA’s shares in Petróleos de Venezuela Holding, 
Inc. (“PDVH”), its wholly owned U.S. subsidiary.  PDVH is 
the holding company for CITGO Holding, Inc., which in turn 
owns CITGO Petroleum Corp. (“CITGO”), a Delaware 
Corporation headquartered in Texas (though best known for 
the CITGO sign outside Fenway Park in Boston). 
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This attachment suit is governed by the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 
(the “Sovereign Immunities Act”).  Under federal common law 
first recognized by the Supreme Court in First National City 
Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba 
(“Bancec”), 462 U.S. 611 (1983), a judgment creditor of a 
foreign sovereign may look to the sovereign’s instrumentality 
for satisfaction when it is “so extensively controlled by its 
owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created.” Id. 
at 629.  
Interpreting Bancec, the District Court, per Chief Judge 
Stark, concluded that Venezuela’s control over PDVSA was 
sufficient to allow Crystallex to attach PDVSA’s shares of 
PDVH in satisfaction of its judgment against the country.  
PDVSA and Venezuela, along with PDVSA’s third-party 
bondholders as amici (the “Bondholders”), challenge this 
ruling.   
 Venezuela and the Bondholders do not substantially 
contest the District Court’s finding that it extensively 
controlled PDVSA.  Rather, they raise various jurisdictional 
and equitable objections to the attachment.  Likewise, PDVSA 
primarily contends that its tangential role in the dispute 
precludes execution against its assets under Bancec 
irrespective of the control Venezuela exerts over it.    
 We affirm the District Court’s order granting the writ of 
attachment and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.1  
                                              
1  We also deny PDVSA’s petition for a writ of mandamus and 
dismiss as moot its second appeal. 
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I. Background 
 Factual background 
In 2002, Crystallex contracted with Corporación 
Venezolana de Guayanaan, an organ of the Venezuelan 
government, for the right to develop and extract exclusively for 
20 years the gold deposits at Las Cristinas, Venezuela.  See 
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(“D.C. Crystallex I”), 244 F. Supp. 3d 100, 105–06 (D.D.C. 
2017).  The deposits are among the world’s largest.  Per the 
contract, Crystallex spent hundreds of millions of dollars 
developing the Las Cristinas site.  Id. at 106.  It also performed 
various other obligations under the contract.  Id.  
In 2011, Venezuela nationalized its gold mines and 
seized the Las Cristinas works without providing 
compensation.  As Crystallex asserts and PDVSA does not 
dispute, Venezuela then gave the mining rights at Las Cristinas 
to PDVSA for no consideration, and PDVSA subsequently 
“sold to the Venezuelan Central Bank 40% of its shares in the 
affiliate that was created to exercise those mining rights.”  J.A. 
1194. 
Later that year, Crystallex filed for arbitration under a 
bilateral investment treaty between Canada and Venezuela 
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes.  As noted earlier, the arbitration took place in 
Washington, D.C., and Crystallex won an arbitration award of 
$1.2 billion plus interest.   
Crystallex had its award.  Now it had to collect.   
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 Crystallex’s collection efforts 
 Confirmation proceedings in the District 
of Columbia  
Crystallex filed an action to confirm its award in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  It properly 
served Venezuela, who appeared to defend it.  The Court 
confirmed the award and entered a federal judgment in favor 
of Crystallex.  D.C. Crystallex I, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 122–23.  
After Venezuela failed to satisfy the judgment within 30 days, 
the Court ruled that Crystallex could execute on it.  Crystallex 
Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, No. CV 16-
0661 (RC), 2017 WL 6349729, at *1 (D.D.C. June 9, 2017).  
However, the Court expressly declined to address whether 
Crystallex could attach assets held by PDVSA and its 
subsidiaries.  Id. at *2.  Venezuela appealed the ruling, and the 
D.C. Circuit affirmed it.  Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, No. 17-7068, 2019 WL 668270, at *2 
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2019).  
 Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act proceedings 
While arbitration was pending and then after the award 
was announced, Crystallex brought suits against CITGO, 
CITGO Holding, PDVH, and PDVSA in the Delaware District 
Court.  See Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. PDV Holding, Inc. (1:15-
CV-1082); Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. PDV Holding, Inc. (1:16-
CV-1007).  It claimed that Venezuela refused to pay its 
arbitration award and “thwart[ed] enforcement” by transferring 
its assets among several entities—PDVSA, PDVH, and 
CITGO— allegedly in violation of the Delaware Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, 6 Del. C. §§ 1301–11.  Crystallex 
Int’l Corp. v. Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., 879 F.3d 79, 82 (3d 
Cir. 2018).  The Court denied PDVH’s motion to dismiss, but 
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we reversed and held that a transfer from a non-debtor could 
not be a “fraudulent transfer” under the Act.  Id. at 81 (“While 
we do not condone the debtor’s and the transferor’s actions, we 
must conclude that Crystallex has failed to state a claim under 
[the Act].”).  That panel noted explicitly but reserved judgment 
on the question now before us—whether PDVSA could be 
liable for the arbitration award as an “alter ego” of Venezuela.  
Id. at 84 n.7.   
 Proceedings in this appeal 
While the award-confirmation appeal was pending in 
the D.C. Circuit, Crystallex followed up its judgment by filing 
an attachment action against Venezuela in the Delaware 
District Court.  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), 
Crystallex attempted to attach PDVH shares owned by 
PDVSA.  That rule provides:  “A money judgment is enforced 
by a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise.  The 
procedure on execution—and in proceedings supplementary to 
and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the 
procedure of the state where the court is located,” here 
Delaware, “but a federal statute governs to the extent it 
applies.”  Delaware law permits a judgment creditor to obtain 
a writ of attachment (known by its Latin name, fieri facias, or 
simply fi. fa.) over various forms of property belonging to the 
debtor, including its shares in a Delaware corporation.  See 10 
Del. C. § 5031; 8 Del. C. § 324(a).  
Though not named in the attachment proceeding, 
PDVSA intervened in the District Court.  It moved to dismiss 
the proceeding on the ground of sovereign immunity under the 
Sovereign Immunities Act.   
After several rounds of briefing and hearings, the 
District Court concluded that PDVSA was Venezuela’s “alter 
ego” under Bancec.  Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian 
10 
 
Republic of Venezuela (“Del. Crystallex”), 333 F. Supp. 3d 
380, 414 (D. Del. 2018).  The Court held (1) it had jurisdiction 
to order attachment against PDVSA’s U.S.-based commercial 
assets, and (2) Crystallex could attach PDVSA’s shares of 
PDVH to satisfy the judgment against Venezuela.  A follow-
up order, dated August 23, 2018, directed the Clerk to issue the 
writ and have it served in furtherance of an execution through 
a public sale of PDVH stock.  PDVSA appealed both of these 
orders (docketed in our Court as Nos. 18-2797 & 18-3124), and 
also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus (No. 18-2889) to 
prevent completion of the sale during this appeal.  We 
consolidated all three appeals for oral argument and resolution.   
While they were pending before us, Venezuela moved 
to intervene and to stay these appeals for 120 days so that it 
could further evaluate its legal position.  By order dated March 
20, 2019, we granted Venezuela’s motion to intervene and 
participate in oral argument.  We also permitted it to file 
supplemental briefing.  We did not rule on its motion to stay 
but stated we would consider that motion at oral argument.  At 
that argument, Venezuela chose to forgo further pursuit of a 
stay.  Oral Arg. Tr. at 180:1–7 (Apr. 15, 2019). 
 Relationship between Venezuela and PDVSA  
The District Court’s primary ruling was that PDVSA is 
Venezuela’s “alter ego” under Bancec.  Numerous facts are 
relevant to that determination, as discussed in more detail 
below.  In general, it is undisputed the relationship between 
PDVSA and Venezuela has tightened significantly since 2002, 
when then-President Hugo Chávez fired roughly 40% of the 
PDVSA workforce for protesting increased Venezuelan 
control over the company.  Since then PDVSA’s presidents 
have generally been senior members of the Venezuelan 
president’s cabinet, including members of the Venezuelan 
military.  Venezuela has also passed various laws that require 
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PDVSA to fund both government initiatives and discretionary 
government funds.  Venezuela controls PDVSA’s domestic oil 
production, sales, and pricing.  It also requires that PDVSA 
supply Venezuela and its strategic allies with oil at below-
market rates. 
 The Bondholders’ interests 
Also relevant to this appeal are the various bonds that 
PDVSA has issued over the past decade or so.  Several holders 
of PDVSA bonds due to mature in 2020 moved to intervene as 
amici in this appeal.  They include BlackRock Financial 
Management, Inc. and Contrarian Capital Management, LLC.  
Their bonds have an outstanding face value of approximately 
$1.684 billion and are secured by a 50.1% collateral interest in 
PDVH’s shares of Citgo Holding, Inc. as security for the 
bonds.  According to the Bondholders, PDVSA has also issued 
roughly $25 billion in bonds to U.S. and non-U.S. capital 
markets investors.  
 U.S. policy towards Venezuela and PDVSA 
President Nicolas Maduro became the President of 
Venezuela in 2013.  This year Juan Guaidó, Venezuelan’s 
opposition leader and president of the National Assembly, has 
made efforts to oust Maduro and take control of the 
Venezuelan government.  The United States Government 
recognized Guaidó as the rightful leader of Venezuela on 
January 23, 2019.2    
                                              
2 As a practical matter, there is reason to believe that Guaidó’s 
regime does not have meaningful control over Venezuela or its 
principal instrumentalities such as PDVSA.  Nonetheless, 
under Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 138 
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Five days later, as part of a broader effort to convince 
the Maduro regime to cede power, the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“OFAC”) 
imposed new sanctions against PDVSA by adding it to the List 
of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.  As 
discussed further below, the U.S. Government has also 
promulgated several executive orders limiting transfer of 
Venezuelan or PDVSA-controlled assets in the United States.   
II. Jurisdiction and standard of review 
The parties dispute whether the District Court had 
jurisdiction to attach PDVSA’s property to satisfy the 
judgment against Venezuela.  The Court held that it had both 
ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the judgment and an 
independent basis for jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. § 1330 and 28 
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) because PDVSA was Venezuela’s alter 
ego.  Section 1330 grants federal-court jurisdiction over “any 
nonjury civil action” against a foreign sovereign, so long as the 
sovereign is properly served under 28 U.S.C. § 1608 and is not 
entitled to sovereign immunity.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)–(b).  
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1604, foreign sovereigns and their 
instrumentalities are entitled to sovereign immunity in U.S. 
courts except as provided in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–1607.  Section 
1605(a)(6), the immunity exception applied by the District 
Court in this case, provides an exception to immunity for 
actions seeking to compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement 
or to enforce arbitration awards that meet certain criteria.   
We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s 
denial of PDVSA’s motion to dismiss as an immune sovereign 
                                              
(1938), we recognize Guaidó’s regime as authorized to speak 
and act on behalf of Venezuela in these appeals.   
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and the grant of Crystallex’s motion for a writ of attachment 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69.  We have 
jurisdiction to review the former under the collateral order 
doctrine.  See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 
1270, 1279–82 (3d Cir. 1993).3  Our jurisdiction exists for the 
latter because it amounted to a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 by leaving the District Court “nothing left to do but 
execute[.]”  Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Office of Children and Youth, 
752 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2014).  
We review questions of law de novo and findings of fact 
for clear error, and we review de novo the ultimate 
determination whether to treat PDVSA as Venezuela’s alter 
ego.  See Clientron Corp. v. Devon IT, Inc., 894 F.3d 568, 575 
(3d Cir. 2018). 
III. Analysis  
The parties raise a host of issues.  We group them into 
three core inquiries:  (A) whether the Bancec “alter ego” 
doctrine determines the District Court’s jurisdiction to attach 
PDVSA’s assets (it does), (B) the scope of the Bancec inquiry 
and whether its factors are satisfied here (they are), and (C) 
                                              
3 The collateral order doctrine allows us to exercise jurisdiction 
over interlocutory appeals, such as this one, when the order 
“conclusively determines the disputed question, resolves an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
action, and is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.”  Fed. Ins. Co., 12 F.3d at 1279–80 (brackets and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–47 (1949) 
(articulating the doctrine).  
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whether PDVSA’s shares of PDVH are immune from 
attachment under the Sovereign Immunities Act (they are not).  
 Bancec controls the jurisdictional inquiry here. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over 
Venezuela.  
As noted, Crystallex confirmed its arbitration award 
against Venezuela in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, which yielded a federal judgment.  It then registered 
that judgment for enforcement in the Delaware District Court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1963.  That section provides that a judgment 
so registered “shall have the same effect as a judgment of the 
district court of the district where registered and may be 
enforced in like manner.”  Id.  After registering the judgment, 
Crystallex moved to enforce it by attaching assets under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a).  
As a threshold question, we consider whether the 
District Court in Delaware had jurisdiction over Venezuela, the 
only party named as a defendant here.  It is undisputed that the 
D.C. District Court had jurisdiction over Venezuela under the 
Sovereign Immunity Act’s arbitration exception, 28 U.S.C. § 
1605(a)(6).  It is well established that federal courts have 
ancillary jurisdiction to enforce their judgments.  See IFC 
Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Int’l Partners, LLC, 438 F.3d 
298, 311 (3d Cir. 2006).  That jurisdiction applies to “a broad 
range of supplementary proceedings involving third parties to 
assist in the protection and enforcement of federal 
judgments—including attachment . . . [and] garnishment.”  
Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356, 359 & n.7 (1996).  
Furthermore, ancillary enforcement jurisdiction—or its 
functional equivalent—has been routinely applied to post-
judgment enforcement proceedings against a foreign 
sovereign.  See First City, Texas Houston, N.A. v. Rafidain 
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Bank, 281 F.3d 48, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2002); Peterson v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 
150 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  In other words, when a party establishes 
that an exception to sovereign immunity applies in a merits 
action that results in a federal judgment—here, the exception 
for confirming arbitration awards, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)—
that party does not need to establish yet another exception 
when it registers the judgment in another district court under 
28 U.S.C. § 1963 and seeks enforcement in that court.  Rather, 
the exception in the merits action “sustain[s] the court’s 
jurisdiction through proceedings to aid collection of a money 
judgment rendered in the case . . . .”  First City, 281 F.3d at 
53–54.  
According to Venezuela, we should forbid Crystallex 
from using the § 1963 procedure in this case, as that procedure 
for registering a judgment cannot be applied to a foreign 
sovereign at all because it is “preempted by [the Sovereign 
Immunities Act].”  (Venezuela Br. at 9–16.)4  Venezuela 
presents this position as a two-pronged jurisdictional 
argument.  First, it contends that § 1963 does not confer 
personal jurisdiction over it because the only method for 
establishing jurisdiction is by making proper service under the 
Sovereign Immunities Act’s service provisions, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1608.  (Venezuela Br. at 9–12.)  We disagree:  § 1608 applies 
only to the “summons and complaint,” id., whereas “[s]ervice 
of post-judgment motions is not required.”  Peterson, 627 F.3d 
at 1130.   
Second, Venezuela asserts that § 1963 does not create 
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns and cannot 
                                              
4 We note that, as a doctrinal matter, “preemption” generally 
refers to the effect of a federal statute on state law rather than 
on other federal statutes. 
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be used to “piggyback” on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
court that rendered the judgment being enforced.  (Venezuela 
Br. at 12–16.)  Regardless whether § 1963 separately confers 
subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, a district 
court has jurisdiction to enforce a federal judgment against a 
foreign sovereign when it is registered under § 1963.  This is 
so, as noted, because the jurisdictional basis from the action 
resulting in the judgment carries over to the post-judgment 
enforcement proceeding in a manner akin to the ordinary 
operation of a district court’s enforcement jurisdiction over 
post-judgment proceedings.  See First City, 281 F.3d at 53–54; 
Peterson, 627 F.3d at 1123; Transaero, 30 F.3d at 150. 
A recent decision by the Supreme Court reinforces our 
rejection of Venezuela’s novel § 1963 argument.  See Republic 
of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1054 (2019).  It involved 
a § 1963 proceeding against the instrumentalities of a foreign 
sovereign—the same procedural posture we have here.  The 
Court resolved that case on a ground not relevant here, but, 
notably, it expressed no concern about the use of a § 1963 
proceeding against a foreign sovereign.  If Venezuela’s view 
of § 1963 were correct, Harrison would presumably have said 
so.5  
In short, before the Delaware District Court and us is a 
continuation of the action in the D.C. District Court.  As the 
latter had jurisdiction over Venezuela—by virtue of the 
Sovereign Immunities Act’s arbitration exception, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605(a)(6)—both Courts that follow, the Delaware District 
Court and our Court, also have jurisdiction.  
                                              
5 Indeed, Justice Thomas would have affirmed the Second 
Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction—implicitly concluding there 
was no § 1963 jurisdictional problem.  Id. at 1066 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
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 The District Court properly used Bancec 
to extend its jurisdiction to assets held 
nominally by PDVSA.  
Taking a different tack, PDVSA concedes the District 
Court had jurisdiction over Venezuela but believes that Bancec 
cannot be used to extend that jurisdiction to reach the assets of 
PDVSA, a non-party to the merits action.  We part company 
again. 
To reach this conclusion, we first consider our decision 
in Federal Insurance, 12 F.3d at 1287.  There we joined other 
circuits in holding that, although the Bancec doctrine came in 
a case involving the shifting of substantive liability, it also 
applied to extend a district court’s jurisdiction over a foreign 
sovereign to reach an extensively controlled instrumentality.  
See id. (collecting cases).  On a straightforward application of 
Federal Insurance, the District Court’s jurisdiction over 
Venezuela would extend to PDVSA so long as it is 
Venezuela’s alter ego under Bancec.  See De Letelier v. 
Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 795 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying 
Bancec in post-judgment enforcement proceeding); Alejandre 
v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 F.3d 
1277, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999) (same).  
That potential application of Federal Insurance 
deserves a closer look.  The decision was in the context of a 
merits action—it did not address the post-judgment 
enforcement setting we have here.  12 F.3d at 1287.  According 
to PDVSA, that distinction makes all the difference.  It claims 
that a district court cannot exercise post-judgment enforcement 
jurisdiction over a party other than the judgment debtor based 
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on a theory of “alter ego” or “veil piercing”6 unless it has an 
“independent basis” for jurisdiction over the third party.  
(PDVSA Br. at 24–27.)  For that proposition, PDVSA cites 
Peacock, 516 U.S. at 357, in which a plaintiff who had 
obtained a federal judgment against his employer under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) 
filed a new action in a federal court against a shareholder of the 
employer seeking to hold him liable by “piercing the corporate 
veil.”  Id. at 353.  The Court ruled that action was not within 
the district court’s ancillary enforcement jurisdiction because 
it does not extend to “a subsequent lawsuit to impose an 
obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not 
already liable for that judgment.”  Id. at 357.   
According to PDVSA, Peacock precludes the District 
Court from exercising ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over 
this action because it seeks to “shift liability for payment of an 
existing judgment to a third party that is not otherwise liable 
on the judgment.”  (PDVSA Br. at 24 (citing Peacock).)  That 
reading of Peacock misfires.  It was not a case involving 
foreign sovereigns or the Sovereign Immunities Act.  The Act 
is a specialized jurisdictional statute designed to address a 
specific problem—the extent to which foreign sovereigns and 
their instrumentalities are immune from suit and attachment in 
our courts.  And the Bancec doctrine—the applicability of 
which is the core question here—is a federal common-law 
outgrowth of that specialized statute.  It (the doctrine) exists 
specifically to enable federal courts, in certain circumstances, 
to disregard the corporate separateness of foreign sovereigns to 
                                              
6 These terms in legal context mean that if an entity’s separate 
form (typically as a subsidiary corporation) is so disregarded 
by the one who controls it (the “parent”), the “corporate veil” 
can be “pierced,” that is, separateness is ignored. 
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avoid the unfair results from a rote application of the immunity 
provisions provided by the Sovereign Immunities Act.  
Nothing in Peacock leads us to believe the Supreme Court 
expected or intended its decision in that case to restrain the 
application of Bancec in post-judgment proceedings. 
Moreover, in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. 
Ct. 816, 823 (2018), the Supreme Court all but confirmed that 
Bancec can indeed be used to reach the assets of a foreign 
sovereign’s extensively controlled instrumentality through 
post-judgment attachment proceedings.  The Court examined 
28 U.S.C. § 1610(g), a provision of the Sovereign Immunities 
Act related to attachments of assets held by agencies and 
instrumentalities of states that have sponsored terrorism.  Id.  It 
observed that § 1610(g)(1), which was added to the Sovereign 
Immunities Act by congressional amendment in 2008, 
“incorporate[s] almost verbatim the five Bancec factors [they 
are noted below], leaving no dispute that, at a minimum, § 
1610(g) serves to abrogate Bancec with respect to the liability 
of agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state where a 
[terrorism-related-judgment] holder seeks to satisfy a 
judgment held against the foreign state.”  Id.  We take from this 
the implication that in ordinary FSIA attachment 
proceedings—i.e., those that do not involve judgments based 
on state-sponsored terrorism—the judgment holder may reach 
the assets of the foreign judgment debtor by satisfying the 
Bancec factors.  See id.  Indeed, the Court expressly stated that, 
where 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) does not apply, a plaintiff with a 
judgment against the sovereign would need to satisfy the 
Bancec factors if it sought, for example, “to collect against 
assets located in the United States of a state-owned 
telecommunications company.”  Id. at 23–24 (citing Alejandre, 
183 F.3d 1277) (emphasis added).   
These analyses confirm the relevance of Bancec here:  
so long as PDVSA is Venezuela’s alter ego under Bancec, the 
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District Court had the power to issue a writ of attachment on 
that entity’s non-immune assets to satisfy the judgment against 
the country.  See Hercaire Int’l, Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 
559, 563–65 (11th Cir. 1987) (looking to the Sovereign 
Immunities Act and Bancec to determine “whether the assets 
of a foreign state’s wholly-owned national airline are subject 
to execution to satisfy a judgment obtained against the foreign 
state, where the airline was neither a party to the litigation nor 
was in any way connected with the underlying transaction 
giving rise to the suit”); Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 
962 F.2d 528, 532–38 (5th Cir. 1992) (doing the same to 
determine whether the district court had jurisdiction to conduct 
a garnishment proceeding against a foreign instrumentality, 
where the purported basis for jurisdiction was solely the 
actions of the instrumentality’s agents). 
 Whether Venezuela is PDVSA’s alter ego under 
Bancec  
“Due respect for the actions taken by foreign sovereigns 
and for principles of comity between nations” caused the 
Supreme Court to conclude in Bancec that “government 
instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and 
independent from their sovereign should normally be treated 
as such.”  462 U.S. at 626–27.  Recognizing the respect due to 
foreign sovereigns, the Court adopted a “presumption of 
independent status” for instrumentalities.  Id. at 627.  PDVSA, 
as an instrumentality of Venezuela separately formed in 1976, 
is accorded that presumption.  It is not to be taken lightly, as 
the District Court noted.  Del. Crystallex, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 
396 (D. Del. 2018) (citing Arch Trading Corp. v. Republic of 
Ecuador, 839 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir. 2016)); see also De 
Letelier, 748 F.2d at 795 (“[B]oth Bancec and the [Sovereign 
Immunities Act’s] legislative history caution against too easily 
overcoming the presumption of separateness.”).   
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 Extensive control standard under Bancec 
In Bancec the Supreme Court allowed a U.S. bank to 
recover assets from a Cuban instrumentality to satisfy a debt 
owed by the Republic of Cuba.  Bancec, 462 U.S. at 613.  It 
held that while there exists a strong presumption that 
government instrumentalities have a separate legal identity 
(along with limited liability) from their “parent” governments, 
this presumption can be overcome in certain situations—for 
example, “where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled 
by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is 
created, we have held that one may be held liable for the 
actions of the other.”  Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629 (citing NLRB v. 
Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402–404 (1960)).   “In 
addition,” it recognized “the broader equitable principle that 
the doctrine of corporate entity, recognized generally and for 
most purposes, will not be regarded when to do so would work 
fraud or injustice.”  Id. (quoting Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 
306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939)).  Thus we recognize Bancec 
establishes a disjunctive test for when the separate identities of 
sovereign and instrumentality should be disregarded: when 
there is “extensive[] control,” and when not disregarding 
separate identities would work a “fraud or injustice.”   Rubin, 
138 S. Ct. at 823. 
Bancec did not develop a “mechanical formula” for 
determining when these exceptions should apply, however, 
which left “lower courts with the task of assessing the 
availability of exceptions on a case-by-case basis.”  Rubin, 138 
S. Ct. at 823.  In ensuing decades district and circuit courts 
applied the Bancec extensive-control test in various contexts.  
Several multi-factor tests emerged in that period—the Second 
Circuit, for example, had a non-exhaustive five-factor test, see 
EM Ltd. v. Banco Cent. De La Republica Argentina, 800 F.3d 
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78, 91 (2d Cir. 2015), which the District Court applied here.7  
By and large the multi-factor tests for extensive control 
percolating through the federal courts covered similar ground, 
see, e.g., Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of 
Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375, 1380 n.7, 1381 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(identifying five extensive-control factors), though at least one 
court has piled on the factors, see Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of 
Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 2006) (recognizing 
21 factors relevant to extensive control);  
In Rubin, the Supreme Court recently provided a further 
gloss on the Bancec factors, which we believe clarifies the 
analysis of the extensive-control prong here.  The plaintiffs 
there held a § 1605A-judgment against the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and attempted to attach and execute against certain Iranian 
artifacts on loan to the University of Chicago.  Rubin, 138 S. 
Ct. at 820.  In the course of addressing whether that attachment 
                                              
7 These factors include:  
whether the sovereign nation: (1) uses the 
instrumentality’s property as its own; (2) ignores 
the instrumentality’s separate status or ordinary 
corporate formalities; (3) deprives the 
instrumentality of the independence from close 
political control that is generally enjoyed by 
government agencies; (4) requires the 
instrumentality to obtain approvals for ordinary 
business decisions from a political actor; and (5) 
issues policies or directives that cause the 
instrumentality to act directly on behalf of the 
sovereign state. 
EM Ltd., 800 F.3d at 91; Del. Crystallex, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 
401.   
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was proper (it was not), the Court identified five “Bancec 
factors” to aid circuit courts in their analysis: 
(1) the level of economic control by the 
government; 
(2) whether the entity’s profits go to the 
government; 
(3) the degree to which government 
officials manage the entity or otherwise 
have a hand in its daily affairs; 
(4) whether the government is the real 
beneficiary of the entity’s conduct; and 
(5) whether adherence to separate 
identities would entitle the foreign state to 
benefits in United States courts while 
avoiding its obligations. 
Id. at 823 (quoting Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc., 965 F.2d 
at 1380 n.7).  We use these factors identified in Rubin to 
structure our analysis here.  At the same time, we recognize 
that they, like the other extensive control tests our sister circuits 
have adopted,8 are meant to aid case-by-case analysis rather 
                                              
8  We follow Crystallex’s suggestion to apply the Rubin factors, 
and neither Venezuela nor PDVSA indicates a preference 
between them and those the District Court applied.  Either 
inquiry compels the same result.  See generally Del. Crystallex, 
333 F. Supp. 3d at 406–14.  But an unresolved point of 
ambiguity remains: whether the Rubin factors apply only to the 
extensive-control inquiry (as in Walter Fuller) or to both 
disjunctive tests.  The parties do not address this issue, and so 
we leave it for a future panel.   
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than establish a “mechanical formula” for identifying extensive 
control. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633.   
 Bancec’s scope  
PDVSA and the Bondholders raise together six 
challenges to the District Court’s inquiry under Bancec: that (i) 
a sovereign’s extensive control, alone, cannot allow courts to 
ignore the separateness of a corporation from the country it is 
in, (ii) Crystallex must show PDVSA acted as Venezuela’s 
agent against Crystallex, (iii) we must consider the third-party 
interests of PDVSA’s bondholders, (iv) extensive control must 
be shown by clear and convincing evidence, (v) the Bancec 
inquiry must be examined in light of current circumstances, 
particularly the limited control of the Guaidó regime over 
PDVSA; and (vi) Bancec requires that courts also balance 
equities when they consider whether to discard an 
instrumentality’s presumption of separateness.  We address 
each argument in turn. 
i. Bancec’s extensive control prong does 
not require a nexus between the 
plaintiff’s injury and the 
instrumentality. 
PDVSA contends that there must be some connection 
between the sovereign’s abuse of its instrumentality’s 
corporate form and the plaintiff’s injury.  Indeed PDVSA 
declined our numerous invitations at oral argument to argue 
that any of the extensive control factors cut against Crystallex’s 
position.  It reiterated its position that each is irrelevant here 
because Crystallex also needed to show that PDVSA did 
something to cause the plaintiff’s injury.  Oral Arg. Tr. at 
97:22–104:12 (Apr. 15, 2019).  We differ.   
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First, though Bancec involved the “fraud or injustice” 
prong rather than the “extensive control” prong, no nexus 
existed between the dominated instrumentality and the 
plaintiff’s injury.  Cuba had established in 1960 Banco Para El 
Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), “[a]n official 
autonomous credit institution for foreign trade . . . with full 
juridical capacity . . . of its own . . . .” Bancec, 462 U.S. at 613.  
Bancec was a creditor of Citibank and sued the bank to collect 
on a letter of credit.  Days later, the Cuban government seized 
all of Citibank’s Cuba-based assets.  Id.  It also dissolved 
Bancec after that proceeding began, and the remainder of its 
case was handled by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade.  Id. 
at 615.  Despite no link between Bancec and Cuba’s seizure of 
Citibank’s assets, the Supreme Court held Citibank could 
offset its debt to Bancec with the value of the expropriated 
assets.  “Giving effect to Bancec’s separate juridical status in 
these circumstances” would cause an injustice.  Id. at 632.  In 
recounting the case’s history, the Court also expressly noted 
that the Second Circuit, from where the case came, had applied 
a nexus requirement and then did not adopt one itself.  See id. 
at 619 (quoting the Second Circuit as saying the presumption 
of separate identities may be overcome only “when the subject 
matter of the counterclaim assertible against the state is state 
conduct in which the instrumentality had a key role”).   
Like Bancec, not a single factor recognized in Rubin 
suggests any link between the dominated instrumentality and 
the injury to the plaintiff.  The Rubin Court’s brief discussion 
of the hypothetical plaintiff seeking to collect against “the 
assets located in the United States of a state-owned 
telecommunications company,” and citation to Alejandre 
(which in turn involved no connection between the 
telecommunications agency and the plaintiff’s injury), likewise 
suggest no tying requirement.  Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 824.   
Similarly, the vast majority of circuits have required no link 
between the abuse of the corporate form and the plaintiff’s 
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injury under the first Bancec path for veil-piercing.  See, e.g., 
EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 478 (2d Cir. 
2007); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 
1071–73 (9th Cir. 2002); Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La 
Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
Hercaire Int’l, Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559, 565 (11th Cir. 
1987).9   
Second, as Crystallex observes, requiring an 
independent nexus requirement would likely read the Bancec 
extensive-control test out of the doctrine.  When pressed at oral 
argument to identify the circumstances where Bancec could be 
applied, PDVSA offered two: under Bancec’s “fraud or 
injustice” prong (i.e., where a sovereign uses its 
instrumentality’s separate status to perpetuate a fraud or 
injustice) or where the instrumentality was itself “responsible 
on the arbitration award as a participant in the events.”  Oral 
Arg. Tr. at 91: 7–18.  But if the instrumentality were directly 
liable for the award, there would be no need to invoke Bancec 
at all.  PDVSA thus tries to read the extensive control prong 
out of Bancec.  We cannot. 
The District Court concluded correctly that Bancec does 
not require a connection between a sovereign’s extensive 
control of its instrumentality and the plaintiff’s injury.  Control 
                                              
9 One panel of the Fifth Circuit has suggested that Bancec’s 
alter ego standards are the same as common state-law 
requirements, many of which include a nexus requirement.  See 
Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411, 416 
(5th Cir. 2006).  But see First Inv. Corp. of Marshall Islands v. 
Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 752–53 (5th 
Cir. 2012), as revised (Jan. 17, 2013). 
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alone, if sufficiently extensive, is an adequate basis to 
disregard an instrumentality’s separate status.10   
ii. Bancec does not require a principal-
agent relationship. 
PDVSA also argues that the requirement in Bancec of 
extensive control such “that a relationship of principal and 
                                              
10 At oral argument, PDVSA stressed that Bancec clearly 
assumed for “extensive control” a connection between the 
abused form and the plaintiff’s injury when it cited to the 1974 
edition of W.M. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations.  Oral Arg. Tr. at 77: 9–11 (“Fletcher says 
domination and control [are] not enough. You need to have an 
abuse of the form that results in an injury to the plaintiff.”).  
But the excerpt Bancec quotes squarely contradicts such a 
narrow view:  “[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal 
entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the 
contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used to 
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or 
defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an 
association of persons.”  Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 630 n.19 
(quoting 1 W.M. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 41 (rev. perm. ed. 1974)).  Further, Bancec 
does not even cite to Fletcher to support the proposition that 
extensive control can be sufficient to disregard corporate 
formalities.  For this, it cited to N.L.R.B. v. Deena Artware, 
Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402 (1960), where the Court held that the 
National Labor Relations Board was entitled to seek discovery 
on an alternative theory of liability—“that these separate 
corporations are not what they appear to be, that in truth they 
are but divisions or departments of a ‘single enterprise.’”  Id. 
at 402.  
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agent is created” requires the instrumentality to act as the 
sovereign’s agent with respect to the events in dispute.  Bancec, 
462 U.S. at 629.  Before Rubin, courts struggled with how to 
give meaning to Bancec’s apparent reference to a principal–
agent relationship.  See, e.g., Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 
1080 (9th Cir. 2009).  The most persuasive interpretation of the 
various approaches is by the D.C. Circuit, which recognized 
that “[c]ontrol by the sovereign is relevant in two distinct 
contexts[.]”  Transamerica Leasing, 200 F.3d at 848.  “First, . 
. . when it significantly exceeds the normal supervisory control 
exercised by any corporate parent over its subsidiary and, 
indeed, amounts to complete domination of the subsidiary.”  
Id.  “Second, . . . when the sovereign exercises its control in 
such a way as to make the instrumentality its agent; in that case 
control renders the sovereign amenable to suit under ordinary 
agency principles.”  Id. at 849.  These examples of control are 
disjunctive.  Only one method of domination needs to be 
shown, and Crystallex opts to pursue the former.  Thus further 
discussion of a principal-agent relationship is not necessary. 
iii. Bancec does not require consideration 
of the third-party bondholders. 
Amici bondholders of PDVSA contend Bancec’s 
extensive-control analysis requires consideration of the 
interests of other creditors of the judgment debtor’s alleged 
alter ego, both as a matter of doctrine and of equity.  That 
argument, plausible on its face, does not prevail here.  As a 
doctrinal matter, the overarching framework of the extensive-
control test tells us that third-party creditors’ interest is a 
reason for—not a separate criterion of—the analysis.  Bancec 
explained that those creditors’ interests are part of the reason 
the presumption of separate juridical status is so difficult to 
overcome:  “Freely ignoring the separate status of government 
instrumentalities would result in a substantial uncertainty over 
whether an instrumentality’s assets would be diverted to satisfy 
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a claim against the sovereign, and might thereby cause third 
parties to hesitate before extending credit to a government 
instrumentality without the government’s guarantee.”  462 
U.S. at 626.  For that reason (among others), Bancec counsels 
courts not to ignore separate status.  See also De Letelier v. 
Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 795 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting 
that abuse of the corporate form of the type identified in 
Bancec “must be clearly demonstrated to justify holding the 
‘subsidiary’ liable for the debts of its sovereign ‘parent,’ 
particularly where, as here, LAN apparently has non-party 
private bank creditors”).  To add to this analysis an additional 
unspecific consideration of third-party interests would double-
count the creditors’ concern in an arena of many competing 
concerns.   
The difficulty of overcoming the Bancec presumption is 
also practical comfort: where there is extensive control, we can 
expect reasonable third parties to recognize the risks of 
extending credit.  Here, for example, Venezuela’s relationship 
to PDVSA was clearly disclosed to any prospective holder of 
the latter’s bonds in the offering circular for that issuance:  “We 
are controlled by the Venezuelan government”; obligations 
imposed by the government “may affect our . . . commercial 
affairs”; and “we cannot assure you that the Venezuelan 
government will not, in the future, impose further material 
commitments upon us or intervene in our commercial affairs.”  
JA-608.  Perhaps recognizing that risk, the Bondholders 
protected their extension of credit to PDVSA by obtaining as 
collateral a 50.1% security interest in PDVH’s shares of Citgo 
Holding, Inc., which, of course, will not be impaired by the 
District Court’s writ of attachment.  
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iv. Timeframe: What is the appropriate 
point of reference for the extensive-
control analysis? 
Venezuela argues that the relevant time for a Bancec 
analysis of the relationship between a sovereign and its 
instrumentality is the moment the writ is issued.  But it points 
to no authority for that proposition, and it does not explain why 
our review of the District Court’s Bancec analysis would be 
any different than in the normal course, where we render our 
decision based on the record before the district court and “do[] 
not purport to deal with possible later events.”  Standard Oil 
Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18 (1976) (per curiam); 
Rubin, 12 F.3d at 1284; Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon (New 
York), 807 F.2d 1150, 1165 (3d Cir. 1986).  We follow the 
standard practice.  On remand, Venezuela may direct to the 
District Court credible arguments to expand the record with 
later events. 
v. The burden of proof is preponderance 
of the evidence. 
PDVSA contends that the District Court erred by 
reviewing the parties’ evidence under a “preponderance of the 
evidence” rather than a “clear and convincing” burden of 
proof.  We disagree, but also note that our decision as to the 
burden of proof has no effect on the outcome of our Bancec 
analysis; indeed, the implications of this question matter little 
to this appeal.  PDVSA conceded as much at oral argument that 
our decision as to burden of proof has no effect on the outcome 
of our Bancec analysis.  Oral Arg. Tr. at 95–96: 20–14 (Apr. 
15, 2019). 
PDVSA points to our ruling in Trustees of Nat. Elevator 
Indus. Pension, Health Benefit & Educ. Funds v. Lutyk, 332 
F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 2003), an ERISA veil-piercing case, 
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where at summary judgment we re-affirmed that “evidence 
justifying piercing the corporate veil must be ‘clear and 
convincing.’”  Id. (quoting Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, 
Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1522 (3d Cir. 1994), aff’d, 514 U.S. 938 
(1995)).  Should this federal common law be applied here?  We 
think not.    
The Sovereign Immunities Act is the exclusive basis for 
finding jurisdiction in suits involving foreign sovereigns and 
instrumentalities, and Bancec is binding federal common law 
for disputes under the Act.  Neither indicates that plaintiffs 
must show clear and convincing evidence, while many courts 
have applied a preponderance-of-the evidence standard to 
inquiries under it.  See, e.g., Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 
F.3d 751, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 
737 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d on other grounds sub 
nom. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390 
(2015); S & Davis Int’l, Inc. v. The Republic of Yemen, 218 
F.3d 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000); Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth 
Ave., 257 F. Supp. 3d 463, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (requiring 
preponderance of the evidence for Bancec inquiries); First Inv. 
Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, 
Ltd. of People’s Republic of China, 858 F. Supp. 2d 658, 668 
n.54 (E.D. La. 2012) (also conducting a Bancec extensive 
control inquiry), aff’d 703 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2012); In re 650 
Fifth Ave. & Related Properties, 881 F. Supp. 2d 533, 544 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same); Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of 
Congo, No. 03 CIV. 4578 LAP, 2007 WL 1032269, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (same).  Further, no case cited by the 
parties suggests that the Bancec extensive-control inquiry 
requires clear and convincing evidence.  
Lutyk drew from our Court’s existing precedent holding 
that, where a plaintiff relies on a fraud theory for alter ego, it 
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.  See Kaplan, 
19 F.3d at 1522.  But here Crystallex does not attempt, nor 
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need, to satisfy an element of fraud.11  Further distinguishing 
Lutyk or Kaplan, it here seeks to survive a factual challenge 
under Rule 12(b)(1), which generally requires the plaintiff to 
establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.  See, 
e.g., Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
We also see scant policy reason to depart from existing 
caselaw and require plaintiffs to make a clear and convincing 
showing.  The difficulties of marshaling evidence sufficient to 
show a Bancec relationship present “a substantial obstacle to 
[Sovereign Immunities Act] plaintiffs’ attempts to satisfy 
judgment.”  Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 885 
F. Supp. 2d 429, 435 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d 735 F.3d 934 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013).  In addition to the initial information imbalance 
between the judgment creditor and the foreign sovereign, the 
creditor must gather evidence related to events, witnesses, and 
relationships between a foreign sovereign and its own 
instrumentality, the bulk of which is often within the territorial 
control of the sovereign itself, making discovery a particularly 
onerous task.  Given the difficulties inherent in this evidence 
gathering,12 the preponderance standard is “the measure of 
respect due foreign sovereigns.”  Bank of New York v. 
Yugoimport, 745 F.3d 599, 614 (2d Cir. 2014).  A more 
onerous requirement would tip the balance too far in favor of 
                                              
11 Even if it did, as the Supreme Court has observed, the 
traditional state-law presumption in favor of clear and 
convincing evidence for fraud claims has not always extended 
to Congress, which frequently has required preponderance of 
the evidence for federal fraud claims.  See Grogan v. Garner, 
498 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1991).   
 
12 The parties here rely chiefly on expert affidavits, publicly 
available corporate documents, and news articles. 
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the foreign sovereign at the expense of Bancec’s other core 
concern—ensuring that foreign states not dodge their 
obligations under international law.  Thus we conclude that 
preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate burden of 
proof under Bancec. 
vi. Is there an equitable component to the 
“extensive control” prong of Bancec? 
PDVSA proposes that an “equitable basis” is required 
“to rebut the presumption of separateness” under Bancec’s 
extensive-control prong.  The District Court observed that even 
though Bancec’s two prongs are disjunctive, the extensive-
control inquiry “inherently assumes that some element of 
unfairness would result if the Court fails to treat one entity as 
the alter ego of the other.”  Del. Crystallex, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 
397 n.15.  We need not determine whether this is an 
independent or necessary factor in an extensive-control 
inquiry.  The test discussed in Rubin appears to treat it as such, 
and, as discussed below, it is easily satisfied here.  
 Extensive control determination under Bancec 
Having clarified the contours of the Bancec extensive-
control inquiry, our applying that analysis here is 
straightforward.  Though the factors the District Court applied 
differ slightly from those in Rubin, they are similar enough that 
its factual findings, which we review for clear error, direct the 
same result under either approach to the Bancec inquiry.  While 
PDVSA effectively conceded that Crystallex satisfied each 
factor under Rubin at oral argument, we summarize the 
evidence for the sake of clarity, as the facts are paramount in 
determining when control is so extensive that entity 
separateness fades away as a legal distinction. 
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 Factor 1:  the level of economic control by 
the government 
Venezuela wields extensive economic control over 
PDVSA.  Venezuela’s bondholder disclosures in 2011 and 
2016 stated: “[G]iven that we are controlled by the Venezuelan 
government, we cannot assure you that [it] will not, in the 
future, impose further material commitments upon us or 
intervene in our commercial affairs in a manner that will 
adversely affect our operations, cash flow and financial 
results.”  JA-645; 1921.  They leave no doubt Venezuela has 
the power to intervene and mandate PDVSA’s economic 
policies.  In 2011 PDVSA disclosed that “the Venezuelan 
government required us to acquire several electricity 
generation and distribution companies, as well as certain food 
companies . . . [,] and required . . . us to acquire the assets of 
[another Venezuelan company] at a price to be determined in 
the future.”  JA-608–09.  The District Court found that 
Venezuela requires PDVSA to fund  
Venezuelan programs that have nothing to do 
with its business, causing PDVSA to take on 
additional debt. Such programs include PDVSA 
Agricola S.A., which subsidizes Venezuela’s 
agriculture, industrial infrastructure, and 
produce sectors, and PDVSA Desarrollos 
Urbanos S.A., which subsidizes Venezuela’s 
housing projects. . . .  PDVSA’s total 
contributions to the Venezuelan budget between 
2010 and 2016 were in excess of $119 billion. 
Del. Crystallex, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 409.  In 2014 and 2015, 
PDVSA was required to contribute U.S. $974 million and U.S. 
$3.3 billion, respectively, to social programs and projects.  Id. 
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As its 2011 offering circular to prospective bondholders 
explains, PDVSA’s legal obligations stem in part from the 
Venezuelan constitution, which endows the State with 
significant control over PDVSA and the oil industry in the 
country.  Article 12 provides hydrocarbon deposits within the 
territory of the state are the property of the Republic, JA-1722, 
and Article 302 reiterates “the State reserves to itself, through 
the pertinent organic law, and for reasons of national 
convenience, petroleum activity,” id. at 1558.  Article 303 
addresses the state’s control over PDVSA specifically:  “For 
reasons of economic and political sovereignty and national 
strategy, the State shall retain all shares in Petroleos de 
Venezeula, S.A.”  E.g., JA-350; 386.  In addition, as PDVSA 
disclosed to bondholders, under Article 5 of the Organic 
Hydrocarbons Law, its revenues “are required to be used to 
finance health and education, to create funds for 
macroeconomic stabilization and to make productive 
investments, all in favor of the Venezuelan people.  Those 
social commitments may affect our ability to place additional 
funds in reserve for future uses and, indirectly, our commercial 
affairs.”  Id. at 608.   
The District Court also found that Venezuela exercises 
its economic control over PDVSA by dictating to whom 
PDVSA must sell oil to and at what price.  The 2011 circular 
explains that “[t]he Venezuelan government, rather than the 
international market, determines the price of products . . . sold 
by us through our affiliates in the domestic market.”  Id. at 643.  
Thus Venezuela “dictates the severely discounted price at 
which PDVSA must sell its product to Venezuelan citizens” 
and “forces PDVSA to ‘sell’ oil to third parties for no, or de 
minimis, consideration.”  Del. Crystallex, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 
408 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Per 
Venezuela’s “Petrocaribe” agreements with its allies, PDVSA 
must provide oil to member states at a steep discount on price, 
along with a two-year grace period for payments, on a payment 
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schedule up to 25 years in length with interest rates as low as 
1% (with the option, on Venezuela’s part, to accept deferred 
payments directly in the form of goods and services).  JA-928.  
Under the agreement, Venezuela “may acquire at preferential 
prices . . . sugar, bananas, or other goods or services to be 
determined, which are adversely affected by trade policies of 
rich countries.”  Id.  In other words, as the District Court found, 
PDVSA provides oil while Venezuela maintains the right to 
accept payment.  PDVSA’s financial reports show that, from 
2010 to 2016, it contributed approximately USD $ 77 billion 
under the Petrocaribe agreements.  Id. at 1178.   
The District Court wasn’t finished: “Venezuela 
manipulates PDVSA’s conversion of U.S. Dollars to 
Venezuelan Bolivars to leverage PDVSA’s revenues. . . . 
PDVSA is required to convert foreign currency into 
Venezuelan Bolivars at an artificially low U.S. Dollar to 
Bolivar exchange rate (which is approximately 1/500th of the 
market rate).”  Del. Crystallex, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 410 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Finally, Venezuela controls PDVSA’s debt structure.  
Dr. Roberto Rigobon’s supplemental declaration states that in 
November 2017 President Maduro decreed that Venezuela 
would restructure the external debt of both Venezuela and 
PDVSA.  JA-2013.  He also provided evidence that Venezuela 
made a $1.2 billion payment on a 2017 PDVSA bond.  Id. at 
2014.   
 Factor 2:  whether the entity’s profits go to 
the government 
As PDVSA’s lone shareholder, all profit ultimately runs 
to the Venezuelan government.  In addition, PDVSA pays 
Venezuela taxes and royalties on the oil it produces.  The 
Rigobon Declaration contends that PDVSA pays 
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“extraordinary taxes,” i.e., taxes at an artificial rate designed to 
collect more of PDVSA’s revenues.  Id. at 1172.   
 Factor 3:  the degree to which government 
officials manage the entity or otherwise 
have a hand in its daily affairs 
The Venezuelan government exercises direct and 
extensive control over PDVSA.  President Maduro appoints 
PDVSA’s president, directors, vice-presidents, and members 
of its shareholder council.   Del. Crystallex, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 
407–08.  Crystallex introduced a declaration from Jose Ignacio 
Hernandez, a Venezuelan legal academic, which notes that it 
has been “commonplace” since 2002 for PDVSA’s president 
also to serve as Venezuela’s oil minister.  JA-1195.  “This 
arrangement allowed the Government to control the daily 
operations of PDVSA.”  Id.  PDVSA and Venezuela’s Ministry 
of Petroleum and Mining share physical office space for its 
headquarters.  Id. at 1196 & n.51.  In a 2014 speech discussing 
the state of Venezuelan control over PDVSA since this 
reorganization, then-PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez 
Carreño, and the country’s Vice Minister for Petroleum, stated 
that “we are one of the few oil producing countries in the world 
that has a strict and tight control over the sovereign 
management of its natural resources.”  Id. at 594.   
The military increasingly exercises control over 
PDVSA.  In November 2017, President Maduro appointed 
Major General Manuel Quevedo as Petroleum Minister and 
PDVSA president.  Id. at 2018.  Earlier that year, he also 
created a new post—Executive Vice-President of PDVSA—
and appointed Vice-Admiral Maribel del Carmen Parra de 
Mestre to the position.  Id. at 1198.    
Venezuela has also wielded substantial influence over 
PDVSA’s employees through a series of politically motivated 
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firings.  The highest profile of these occurred in 2002, when 
President Chávez fired roughly 40% of the PDVSA workforce 
in response to a strike protesting his regime.  Id. at 1054.  
Employees continue to face pressure from the state today.  The 
District Court found that, “[a]s recently as July 2017, 
Venezuela continued to threaten to terminate PDVSA 
employees who were opposed to the governing regime.”  Del. 
Crystallex, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 407.  Employees face pressure 
to attend Socialist Party rallies and have been threatened with 
termination unless they voted in elections.  Id. at 408. 
 Factor 4:  whether the government is the 
real beneficiary of the entity’s conduct 
The District Court found that PDVSA’s cheap oil to 
Venezuela’s strategic allies also creates a mechanism whereby 
Venezuela extracts value from PDVSA’s oil without paying 
the company.  “Venezuela also uses PDVSA to achieve its 
foreign policy goals by committing PDVSA to sell oil to 
certain Caribbean and Latin American nations at substantial 
discounts, without PDVSA’s consent. . . . Even when those oil 
debts are repaid, the money is given to Venezuela, not PDVSA. 
. . .”  Id. at 410.  
PDVSA’s actions with respect to this litigation also 
show how Venezuela is the real beneficiary of PDVSA’s 
conduct.  For example, “it is undisputed that PDVSA paid the 
administrative fees Venezuela incurred in connection with the 
arbitration with Crystallex, which amounted to around 
$249,000.”  Id.  And, when Venezuela expropriated the La 
Cristinas mines, it gave to PDVSA for no consideration a 
number of mining rights, including rights in Las Cristinas that 
it had expropriated from Crystallex.  JA-1194.  This seamless 
transfer of value between PDVSA and Venezuela also suggests 
an alter ego relationship.   
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 Factor 5:  whether adherence to separate 
identities would entitle the foreign state to 
benefits in United States courts while 
avoiding its obligations 
Venezuela owes Crystallex from a judgment that has 
been affirmed in our courts.  Any outcome where Crystallex is 
not paid means that Venezuela has avoided its obligations.  It 
is likewise clear from the record that PDVSA, and by extension 
Venezuela, derives significant benefits from the U.S. judicial 
system.  Its 2020 bonds are backed by the common stock and 
underlying assets of U.S.-based corporations, and hence 
disputes stemming from default will be subject to U.S. laws 
and presumably be resolved through the U.S. legal system.13  
See, e.g., Bayrock Exhibit 6 at 131–32, Crystallex Int’l Corp. 
v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, F. Supp. 3d 380 (D. Del. 
2018), ECF No. 99-1.  Indeed, it is probable the U.S. legal 
                                              
13  Crystallex has not identified any Venezuelan commercial 
assets in Delaware or the District of Columbia and may be 
unable to find satisfaction if attachment of PDVSA property is 
impermissible.  See Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, No. CV 16-0661 (RC), 2017 WL 
6349729, at *2 (D.D.C. June 9, 2017) (“Petitioner has been 
unable to identify any commercial assets belonging to 
[Respondent] in the District of Columbia but believes that 
Respondent possesses assets elsewhere in the United States, 
including in Delaware. . . .  The assets Petitioner identifies are 
connected to Respondent through a variety of corporate 
structures . . .[,] in particular [Respondent’s] indirect 
subsidiaries, PDVH, CITGO Holding, and CITGO Petroleum 
. . . .”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).  
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system is the backstop that gives substantial assurance to 
investors who buy PDVSA’s debt. 
Nor does ignoring separate identities run against the 
equities here.  PDVSA profited directly from Crystallex’s 
injury:  Venezuela transferred the rights to the expropriated 
mines to PDVSA for no consideration.  Hence this factor too 
is satisfied.   
 PDVSA’s Shares of PDVH are attachable under 
the Sovereign Immunities Act. 
Crystallex must also show that the particular property at 
issue in the attachment action—the PDVH stock—is not 
immune from attachment under the Sovereign Immunities Act.  
It provides that “the property in the United States of a foreign 
state shall be immune from attachment arrest and execution” 
unless one of the Act’s statutory exceptions is met.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1609.  The exception Crystallex invokes states that the 
“property in the United States of a foreign state . . ., used for a 
commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune 
from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a 
judgment entered by a court of the United States” based on an 
order confirming an arbitral award rendered against the foreign 
state.  28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6) (emphasis added).14   
The Act defines “commercial activity” as “either a 
regular course of commercial conduct or a particular 
commercial transaction or act.  The commercial character of an 
                                              
14 Section 1610(b) governs execution of a foreign 
instrumentality’s property, but only section 1610(a) is relevant 
because the jurisdictional immunity is overcome for 
Venezuela, not PDVSA, who only enters the picture as 
Venezuela’s alter ego.  
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activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the 
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than 
by reference to its purpose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).  The 
Supreme Court in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 
U.S. 607, 613 (1992), stated that the phrase “commercial 
activity” captures the “distinction between state sovereign acts, 
on the one hand, and state commercial and private acts, on the 
other.”  Id.  “[W]hen a foreign government acts, not as a 
regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player 
within it, the foreign sovereign’s actions are ‘commercial’ 
within the meaning of the [Sovereign Immunities Act].”  Id. at 
614.  Commercial actions include those that “(whatever the 
motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a private 
party engages in ‘trade and traffic or commerce.’”  Id. (quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary) (emphasis in original).15 
PDVSA contends that the commercial activity 
exception requires current commercial use (i.e., at the moment 
the writ is executed), which PDVSA contends is impeded by 
the current U.S. sanctions regime.  There is some support for 
PDVSA’s interpretation.  See Aurelius Capital Partners v. 
Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 130 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he property that is subject to attachment and execution 
must . . . have been ‘used for a commercial activity’ at the time 
the writ of attachment or execution is issued.”) (emphasis in 
original).  But narrowing the temporal inquiry to the day the 
writ is executed unnecessarily leaves room for manipulation, 
as any jurisdictional determination under the Sovereign 
Immunities Act is immediately appealable for interlocutory 
review, and courts (like the District Court here) may elect not 
to issue the writ alongside analysis of the jurisdictional and 
                                              
15 Weltover involved the commercial-activity exception to 
jurisdictional immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a), but its 
interpretation of “commercial” would apply equally here.  
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execution immunity.  A strict day-of-writ inquiry could allow 
parties to avoid execution by freezing assets or otherwise 
ceasing commercial use when the appeal decision is handed 
down.  Instead, a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry seems 
more appropriate, as the Fifth Circuit aptly described:  “This 
analysis should include an examination of the uses of the 
property in the past as well as all facts related to its present use, 
with an eye toward determining whether the commercial use of 
the property, if any, is so exceptional that it is ‘an out of 
character’ use for that particular property.”  Af-Cap Inc. v. 
Republic of Congo, 383 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. 2004).  And “it 
would be appropriate for a court to consider whether the use of 
the property in question was being manipulated by a sovereign 
nation to avoid being subject to garnishment under [the 
Sovereign Immunities Act].”  Id. at 369 n.8.  
But whether we apply the date the writ was issued—
August 23, 2018—or the date of the August 9 opinion, PDVH 
shares are not immune from attachment.  PDVSA argues that 
the shares cannot be used in commerce because they are subject 
of sanctions contained in two Executive Orders.  See Exec. 
Order. No. 13835, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,001 (May 21, 2018) (“E.O. 
13835”); Exec. Order No. 13808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41, 155 (Aug. 
24, 2017) (“E.O. 13808”).   
This argument fails because the sanctions regime 
prohibits only some commercial uses of the shares; other 
commercial uses continue to be exercised by Venezuela.  
Section 1(a)(iv) of E.O. 13808 bars PDVH from paying 
dividends or other distribution of profits to the Government of 
Venezuela,16 and section 1(b) prohibits the “purchase, directly 
                                              
16 The Executive Orders of our Government define “the 
Government of Venezuela” as specifically including PDVSA.  
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or indirectly, by a United States person or within the United 
States, of securities from the Government of Venezuela.”  In 
addition, Section 1(a)(iii) of E.O. 13835 precludes United 
States persons or those within the United States from engaging 
in any transactions, provisions of financing, and other dealings 
related to “the sale, transfer, assignment, or pledging as 
collateral by the Government of Venezuela of any equity 
interest in any entity in which [it] has a 50 percent or greater 
ownership interest.”   
However, the shares can still be used by PDVSA to run 
its business as an owner, to appoint directors, approve 
contracts, and to pledge PDVH’s debts for its own short-term 
debt.  Venezuela illustrates its continued use of this power, 
noting that President Guaidó in February 2019 appointed an ad 
hoc administrative board to represent PDVSA in its capacity as 
sole shareholder of PDVH for appointing a new board of 
directors of that entity.  These actions are available to the sole 
shareholder of a company, and so the shares continue to be 
used in commerce. 
This is not to say that the sanctions of PDVSA assets 
play no role in whether Crystallex ultimately recovers.  
According to a Treasury Department Frequently Asked 
Question, any attachment and execution against PDVSA’s 
shares of PDVH would likely need to be authorized by the 
Treasury Department.  See Del. Crystallex, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 
420–21.  In a case like this, “[Treasury’s Office of Foreign 
Asset Control, called by its acronym OFAC] would consider 
license applications seeking to attach and execute against such 
                                              
E.O. 13808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41156 (“[T]he term . . . means the 
Government of Venezuela, any political subdivision, agency or 
instrumentality thereof, including . . .  [PDVSA] . . .”); E.O. 
13835, 83 Fed. Reg. 24001–02 (same).   
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equity interests on a case-by-case basis.”  Id. at 421.  Whether 
that FAQ is legally binding, Crystallex has committed that it 
“will seek clarification of the current license . . . and/or the 
issuance of an additional license to cover the eventual 
execution sale of the shares of PDVH once the [attachment 
w]rit has issued.”  Id. at 421 n.40 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (ellipsis in original).   
Though the U.S. State Department has not sought to 
provide a statement of interest, it is nonetheless conceivable 
that short- or long-term U.S. foreign policy interests may be 
affected by attachment and execution of PDVSA’s assets.  The 
Treasury sanctions provide an explicit mechanism to account 
for these.  Whether the Treasury Department permits execution 
in this case, it is clear that the sanctions do not make the PDVH 
shares immune from attachment under the Sovereign 
Immunities Act.   
IV. Conclusion 
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, there is a 
strong presumption that a foreign sovereign and its 
instrumentalities are separate legal entities.  But the Supreme 
Court made clear in Bancec and Rubin that in extraordinary 
circumstances—including where a foreign sovereign exerts 
dominion over the instrumentality so extensive as to be beyond 
normal supervisory control—equity requires that we ignore the 
formal separateness of the two entities.  This clears that bar 
easily.  Indeed, if the relationship between Venezuela and 
PDVSA cannot satisfy the Supreme Court’s extensive-control 
requirement, we know nothing that can.   
The District Court acted within its jurisdiction when it 
issued a writ of attachment on PDVSA’s shares of PDVH to 
satisfy Crystallex’s judgment against Venezuela, and the 
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PDVH shares are not immune from attachment.  Thus we 
affirm.  
